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Abstract: 
Recent labour market reforms in Germany aim, among other things, at reducing 
unemployment by restricting passive unemployment measures, emphasizing local labour 
market policies and re-structuring public employment services. This paper uses extensive 
individual administrative and regional aggregate data to explore the extent to which these 
factors are likely to contribute to the shortening of unemployment duration. For this purpose, 
we estimate a semi-parametric duration model with three competing exit states. Our results 
suggest that changes in the unemployment compensation system rather than local 
employment policies and administrative restructuring efforts may shorten unemployment 
duration. In addition, determinants of the length of unemployment vary across exit states. 
 
Keywords: competing-risk, labour market policy, individual and regional data 
JEL: J64, J61, J68 
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1 Introduction 
Throughout the last two decades Germany has experienced persistently high, and even rising, 
levels of unemployment. At the same time, the share of long-term unemployed who remain 
unemployed even after one year of job search has also gone up. According to Machin and 
Manning (1999), the share of long-term unemployment in Germany was almost 50% in 1995. 
This is much higher than in the US, but reflects a labour market situation that is not 
uncommon in many European countries. In this context, improved knowledge of how 
individual characteristics as well as the regional and institutional context shape labour market 
outcomes of unemployed jobseekers is of central concern to policy makers aiming to design 
policies that will contribute to a shortening of the average unemployment duration. However, 
most research on the determinants of unemployment duration has been confined to an analysis 
of individual level determinants (see for Germany: Steiner, 1990; Hunt, 1995; Hujer and 
Schneider, 1996; Steiner, 2001) and the role of individual employment histories in 
determining the duration of unemployment (Lüdemann, Wilke and Zhang, 2006; Fitzenberger 
and Wilke, 2007). Much less attention has been paid to the regional determinants of the 
unemployment duration. Most studies only test for additional region-specific effects (Folmer 
and van Dijke, 1988; Brown and Sessions, 1997; Fahrmeir et al., 2003) and conclude that the 
regional context is a significant determinant of the individual unemployment duration even 
after controlling for major individual-specific factors. Other studies only assess the impact of 
the local unemployment rate or the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio on individual 
unemployment duration (Lindeboom et al., 1994; Petrongolo, 2001; Haurin and Sridhar, 
2003) and typically find the expected prolonging effect of deficient local labour demand on 
the duration of unemployment. Both of these approaches remain rather incomplete with 
respect to improving our understanding of the regional factors that prolong or shorten 
unemployment. We do not know much either about how the institutional context affects 
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individual labour market outcomes. Though there has been a strong interest in the prolonging 
effect of passive labour market policies such as unemployment benefit entitlements on the 
duration of individual unemployment (e.g. Carling et al., 1996; Roed and Zhang, 2003; Cockx 
and Dejemeppe, 2005; Lalive, van Ours and Zweimüller, 2006; Kyyrä and Wilke, 2007), we 
do not know much about the corresponding impact of other institutional aspects such as local 
active labour market policies and local job placement activities. This research gap is 
particularly surprising in the German context because, among other things, recent labour 
market reforms emphasize the role of regionally targeted policy mixes and the organizational 
structure of public employment services. In particular, German policy makers as well as the 
public consider a high ratio of job counsellors to unemployed jobseekers as a key to reduce 
the duration of unemployment. 
The objective of this study is therefore to conduct a comprehensive analysis of unemployment 
duration in Germany. We identify the determinants of the length of unemployment not only 
among individual characteristics, but also consider the regional and institutional context in 
which individuals seek employment. For this purpose, our analysis uses a rich set of 
indicators that capture passive and active labour market policies as well as local economic 
conditions and job counselling activities. Moreover, we use a new generation of German 
administrative individual data that allows three main exit states to be identified each of which 
may be affected quite differently by the regional and institutional context: exits to local 
regular employment, exits to non-local employment via migration and exits to subsidised 
employment. Previously available data sources did not allow exits to subsidised employment 
to be distinguished from exits to regular employment. As a consequence, estimated effects of 
covariates on the duration of unemployment may have been biased if there are heterogeneous 
effects of covariates on different exit types. In the case of subsidised and regular employment, 
biases are quite likely because labour market programs typically aim at cushioning 
unfavourable local labour market conditions. Thus, unfavourable labour market conditions 
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may have an opposing effect on exits to regular and subsidised employment. Similarly, a 
higher migration hazard may be a response to deficient local labour demand that lowers the 
hazard of finding a local job (Arntz, 2005). The paper thus contributes to the literature by 
disentangling the relevance of individual, regional and institutional factors for exiting 
unemployment durations to three important exit states. Since the period covered by our data, 
2000-2004, falls mainly into the pre-reform institutional setup, we cannot evaluate the success 
of recent reform efforts. Instead, our regression type analysis aims at exploring the main 
individual, regional and institutional determinants of unemployment duration in Germany. By 
doing so, we provide evidence about the extent to which recent reforms concerning passive 
labour market measures, regional employment policies and the organization of public 
employment services are likely to contribute to a reduction of unemployment duration. 
Our findings in Section 6 confirm that for both individual and regional covariates, the impact 
differs significantly depending on the type of exit. While deficient local labour demand 
significantly decreases the likelihood of exiting to regular employment in the local area, the 
likelihood of migration and the likelihood of entering subsidised employment significantly 
increase. The estimates from Table 4 and 5 indicate, however, that individual-level 
characteristics have a much stronger impact on the duration of unemployment than regional 
factors. Thus, regional policies may only be a supplementary means of reducing the duration 
of unemployment. Similarly, local active labour market programs and a higher provision of 
counselling resources only marginally affect labour market outcomes of unemployed 
jobseekers and even yield negative labour market outcomes which would be in line with 
recent results for the Netherlands (Van den Berg and Van den Klaauw, 2006). Among the 
regional and institutional factors from Tables 4 and 5, our findings indicate that passive 
labour market policies may have the strongest impact on the duration of unemployment in 
Germany. This is suggested by near zero exit rates of older individuals with long entitlements 
to unemployment benefits who tend to use these benefits as a means of early retirement as 
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well as by major differences in labour market outcomes of unemployed with different income 
replacement rates. 
The structure of our paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a detailed description of the 
unemployment compensation and welfare system and briefly discusses recent labour market 
reforms. A third section provides some theoretical underpinning on how job search across 
multiple labour markets may be affected by regional and institutional factors. Section 4 
presents the individual and regional data used in the analysis and discusses the choice of 
covariates. We then explain the methodological approach before presenting the results in 
section 6. Section 7 concludes and discusses the results in light of the recent reforms. 
2 Institutional context in Germany 
Until 2004, the German unemployment compensation system consisted of two main 
components: unemployment benefits (UB) and unemployment assistance (UA). 
Unemployment benefits which were paid for a period of up to 32 months, depending on an 
individual's age and employment history, were equal to 60 % (67%) of the last net income for 
unemployed individuals without (with) dependent children. Tax-funded and means-tested 
unemployment assistance was paid indefinitely to individuals who had exhausted their 
entitlement to unemployment benefit and continued to provide income replacement rates of 
53% (57%) for individuals without (with) dependent children. This combination of generous 
replacement rates for long-term unemployed and indefinite entitlement length was rather 
exceptional among the OECD countries. As a consequence, replacement rates for long-term 
unemployed in Germany were and still are higher than in many other OECD countries, 
especially for older unemployed with extended periods of entitlement to UB and for 
unemployed with low former earnings who receive complementary tax funded social benefits. 
This meant that income replacement rates higher than 70 % or even over 100 % were 
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common practice for the latter group. From a search-theoretical perspective, high replacement 
rates raise reservation wages and thus prolong unemployment as the potential net gain from 
working compared to not working is small (Mortensen, 1990; Rogerson et al., 2005). The 
institutional design in Germany thus results in work disincentives that are considered to be 
partly responsible for the high share of long-term unemployment in Germany and the 
considerably higher share of long term unemployment among older people (Fitzenberger and 
Wilke, 2004) and the low wage unemployed (Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2007). Moreover, the 
institutional design has also been associated with a lack of jobs for low-skilled workers in 
Germany as the social benefit level implies a relatively high minimum wage that is above the 
productivity level of many low-skilled unemployed. The subsequent empirical analysis of 
unemployment periods between 2000 and 2004 thus draws specific attention to the 
unemployment experiences of individuals with low earning capacities. 
At the end of the 1990s, unemployment rates had reached levels of close to 10% in western 
and close to 19% in eastern Germany. Since the unemployment compensation and welfare 
system in Germany was increasingly made responsible for this development, several labour 
market reforms, the so called Hartz reforms, were introduced between 2002 and 2005 to 
reduce disincentives of the existing institutional framework. In particular the Hartz I-III 
reforms mainly aim at activating the unemployed and increasing the efficiency of job 
placement services and active labour market measures while the Hartz IV reform decoupled 
unemployment compensation for long-term unemployed from the former wage income and 
merged social benefits and unemployment assistance to create the new social benefit1 
(Arbeitslosengeld II). See Jacobi and Kluve (2006) for an extensive overview of the reforms. 
While the Hartz IV reform was not implemented before 2005 and is thus not relevant for our 
analysis, the Hartz I-III reforms already started in 2003. As one major objective, this reform 
shifts resources from labour market programs aimed at the secondary labour market such as 
work creation schemes to measures that aim at integrating individuals into the regular labour 
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market (e.g. training, subsidies for regular employment and self-employment). In order to 
improve the efficiency of allocated resources, programs are targeted more strictly to specific 
groups of unemployed. After profiling jobseekers according to their chances of finding 
regular employment, specific reintegration measures are restricted to those who have a fair 
chance of being reintegrated into the labour market, while work creation schemes are targeted 
to jobseekers with less promising prospects. In order to activate the unemployed to make as 
much effort as possible to regain employment, the reforms introduced stricter sanction rules in 
the case of insufficient search efforts, but also offered a new set of programs such as subsidies 
for people wishing to set up businesses (Ich-AG) and subsidies for employers hiring 
individuals with low productivity levels. 
Another key objective of the Hartz I-III reforms was the restructuring and modernization of 
the federal employment agency (FEA) in order to increase the effectiveness of its placement 
services. For this purpose, its regional employment agencies introduced a client-oriented New 
Customer Service Centre (Kundenzentrum). An entry zone for customer requests and 
questions in addition to scheduled appointments for job counselling now prevent long waiting 
times and increases efficiency. Moreover, computer-based assessments now help in analyzing 
the needs of each customer and thus support tailor-made solutions. These modernization 
measures also aimed at reducing the workload of each counsellor in order to improve the 
quality of job counselling. This new emphasis on job counselling has been facilitated by an 
increase in the number of job placement counsellors since 2002 of almost 30% and a 
consequent improvement in the counsellor/customer ratio, i.e. the number of unemployed 
assisted per placement counsellor. 
Another important aspect of the reform concerns the organization of placement services. In 
contrast to the former hierarchical organization, far greater responsibility has now been 
assigned to local employment agencies. Each local employment agency now has to achieve 
stipulated quantitative goals which are tailored to the specific situation of its regional labour 
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market. For such controlling purposes and the design of regionally tailored policy mixes, the 
federal employment agency asked its research institute, the IAB (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- 
und Berufsforschung) to identify employment agencies with comparable regional conditions. 
The resulting 12 strategic types of employment agencies range from regional employment 
agencies with unfavourable labour market conditions in eastern Germany to agencies with 
favourable and dynamic labour market conditions (Blien et al., 2004). The restructuring of the 
federal employment agency has therefore resulted in an emphasis on job counselling and 
efficient placement services as well as an emphasis on labour market policies which are 
targeted to the regional labour market. These internal changes of the FEA were mainly 
executed by leading international consulting companies who received hundred of millions of 
euros for their input. An empirical analysis of the institutional features is therefore of high 
policy interest. Since the period covered by our data falls mainly into the pre-reform 
institutional setup of the FEA, we cannot evaluate the success of the restructuring effort. It is, 
however, possible to obtain empirical evidence about whether one may expect these changes 
to bring about a strong reduction in unemployment duration. In this respect, our analysis is 
aimed at examining the extent to which institutional and regional factors affect the labour 
market outcomes of jobseekers in Germany once individual factors have been taken into 
account. For this purpose, we use a broad number of covariates that capture the regional 
context and some institutional features such as the counsellor/customer ratio. Moreover, we 
look at exits from unemployment not only to regular but also to subsidised employment and 
take account of the particularities of the German unemployment compensation and welfare 
system by distinguishing between groups of different earning capacities. 
3 Some theoretical underpinning 
Before turning to the empirical approach of our analysis, this section briefly discusses how 
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labour market conditions may affect labour market outcomes after unemployment. In this 
context it is worth considering a framework in which a jobseeker looks for employment in a 
number of distinct labour markets. In the case of simultaneous job-search across these labour 
markets2, the probability of exiting to any of those labour markets can be broken down into 
the job offer probability and the probability of accepting a job offer in this labour market, both 
of which depend on exogenous market conditions and the endogenous search strategy adopted 
by the unemployed job searcher. In particular, jobseekers choose reservation wages for each 
of the distinct markets such that the value of employment at the offered wage is equivalent to 
the value of continuing unemployed job search. Moreover, search effort is allocated across the 
markets so that the marginal value of additional search in each market is equal to the marginal 
cost of searching the market. While reservation wages affect the job acceptance probability, 
the allocation of search effort across distinct markets influences the job offer probability. 
Intuitively, an individual's search strategy should favour finding employment in those labour 
markets that offer the best work conditions. In the case of job search across multiple 
industries, Fallick (1992) has shown that improving conditions in one labour market, i.e. 
increasing job offer probability, raises reservation wages in all markets while at the same time 
shifting search effort towards the improving market and reducing search effort in all others. 
As a consequence, changing exogenous conditions affect the hazard of exiting to a specific 
market not only directly due to, for example, higher job offer probabilities, but also affect 
these hazards indirectly via the endogenous search strategy of the unemployed job searcher. A 
similar notion has also been applied to job-search across sectors (Thomas, 1998) and regions 
(Damm and Rosholm, 2003; Arntz, 2005). 
In our framework, we allow for a local and a non-local labour market and introduce a labour 
market for subsidised jobs. Exits to non-local employment are likely to constitute only a 
relatively small but still noticeable share of all exits as migration levels in Germany are low 
compared with the US, Australia and Canada, but among the highest compared with other 
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European countries (OECD, 2005). We refer to subsidised jobs whenever an individual exits 
to employment in the context of an active labour market program. Such programs mainly 
encompass subsidised jobs in the secondary labour market, subsidies for regular employment 
and subsidies for self-employment (see data section for details). The reforms of recent years 
have brought about a shift from subsidised jobs in the secondary labour market to the latter 
two program types (BA, 2004). In 2002, more than 200,000 jobseekers entered subsidised 
jobs in the secondary labour market and more than 350,000 jobseekers received a subsidy for 
regular employment or self-employment (BA, 2002). Compared with other European 
countries, subsidised employment in Germany is an important part of labour market policy. 
While spending on active labour market policies in Germany has been around average 
compared with other European countries, the proportion spent on subsidised employment has 
been above average in recent years (Martin and Grubb, 2001). Exits to subsidised 
employment are thus likely to constitute a substantial part of all exits from unemployment. 
Applying the above job search framework across multiple labour markets to our particular 
setting, jobseekers are simultaneously looking for employment in the market for regular3 
local, regular non-local and subsidised employment. Thus, jobseekers choose the search 
strategy, i.e. reservation wages and the search effort for each of these markets according to the 
attractiveness of each of these markets in terms of job availability, offered wages and work 
conditions. In many cases, labour market conditions that favour an exit to local regular 
employment may have an opposing effect on non-local exits (Arntz, 2005). Similarly, 
subsidised employment is often a means of cushioning unfavourable local labour market 
conditions. Distinguishing between these three exit states should therefore be quite helpful in 
understanding how the regional and institutional context affects labour market outcomes of 
jobseekers in Germany. For this purpose, the empirical analysis considers a number of 
indicators that capture the exogenous conditions of the local labour market that are discussed 
in detail in the next section. By affecting search strategies, such conditions not only affect the 
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duration of unemployment, they also affect the probability of making a transition to either 
local employment, non-local employment or subsidised employment. Other behaviourally 
distinct and alternative destination states after unemployment that due to data limitations are 
not considered here include exits to self-employment or out of the labour force entirely. Our 
analysis should therefore be considered as a starting point for improving our understanding of 
the impact of labour market conditions on the labour market outcomes of unemployment. 
4 Data 
This section describes how we select the sample and covariates for our analysis. We use 
individual data merged from several administrative registers which is then combined with 
regional data from various sources. 
 
Individual data 
The Sample of the Integrated Employment Biographies V.1 (IEBS) of the Research Data 
Centre (Forschungsdatenzentrum) of the FEA is a new data set which was released in 2005. 
See Hummel et al. (2005) for a detailed description of the data. It is a 2.2 % sample 
containing about 1.4 million individuals in the period 1992-2004. It comprises high quality 
information about employment periods that have been subject to social insurance payments 
and thus excludes civil servants and self-employed individuals. The sample also contains 
information on the receipt of unemployment compensation from the FEA. For the period 
2000-2004, the data set also provides information about participation in active labour market 
programs. One of the major drawbacks of the data is that it only partially identifies the true 
unemployment period. This is because there are unobserved periods in the employment 
trajectories whenever an individual is neither a socially insured employee nor receives 
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unemployment compensation, nor participates in any active labour market program. As a 
consequence, some parts of the individual employment trajectory may not be observed so that 
various proxies for the true unemployment period can be computed based on different criteria 
which define the labour market status of being unemployed, see e.g. Fitzenberger and Wilke 
(2004) and Lee and Wilke (2005) for this problem. In the analysis of this paper we use the 
following proxy for the true unemployment duration: 
Unemployment with permanent income transfers (UPIT) is a lower bound of the true 
unemployment period that defines unemployment as a continued period of transfer 
receipt. Gaps between transfer receipt and the beginning of a new employment period 
need to be less than four weeks. Thus, UPIT excludes periods of unemployment without 
receipt of UB or UA from the FEA. 
Unfortunately, there is no exact way of telling whether this unemployment proxy more 
closely resembles the true length of unemployment than competing proxies. Moreover, the 
data does not contain all necessary information to identify unemployed social benefit 
recipients, a group that we are specifically interested in as discussed in section 2. Entitlements 
to complementary social benefits depend on pre-unemployment earnings but also on the 
number of dependent children as well as financial resources (e.g. spouse income, private 
savings). Since we do not observe enough information in the IEBS about the household 
context nor about its financial resources, no exact identification of unemployed social benefit 
recipients is possible. Individuals with relatively low pre-unemployment wages, however, are 
more likely to receive additional social benefits. We therefore compare unemployment 
periods of social benefit recipients which are contained in the Social Benefit Statistics4 
(Sozialhilfestatistik, SHStat) with unemployment spells in the IEBS for individuals of 
different pre-unemployment earnings in order to choose an income threshold below which 
unemployed in the IEBS are similar to unemployed social benefit recipients. Moreover, we 
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conduct this comparison not only for the above UPIT proxy of unemployment in the IEBS, 
but also for a wider proxy which also adds nonemployment periods to the unemployment 
duration. A comparison of the corresponding distributions of unemployment duration 
suggests that the UPIT proxy for individuals with pre-unemployment gross earnings of less 
than 60 euros per day better represents the group of unemployed social benefit recipients than 
the competing unemployment proxy or other income thresholds. A daily gross wage of 60 
euros closely corresponds to the lowest wage quintile for full-time employees in western 
Germany and to the lowest two wage quintiles for full-time employees in eastern Germany. 
Applying the same income threshold for both parts of Germany may thus appear somewhat 
crude. Robustness checks using, for example, unemployed in the lowest wage quintile for 
both parts of Germany, did not significantly change the results. We therefore decided to apply 
the UPIT definition in the subsequent empirical analysis and stick to the chosen threshold of 
60 euros daily gross earnings to distinguish individuals of low-earning capacities from 
individuals with higher earning capacities. Individuals above this threshold are less likely to 
receive additional social benefits and should thus have different unemployment experiences 
than their low-earning counterparts. 
For all UPIT unemployment spells, we observe the exit state if the spell is not right-censored 
due to the end of the observation period and if the unemployed continuously receives income 
transfers from the FEA. As discussed in the theoretical section, we distinguish between local 
regular employment, non-local regular employment (migration) and subsidised employment. 
We define migration as movements between non-adjacent labour market regions 
(Arbeitsmarktregionen). The 227 labour market regions (LMRs) in Germany comprise typical 
daily commuting ranges such that for the majority of individuals the workplace is located 
within the LMR. Finding employment in a non-adjacent LMR therefore usually necessitates 
residential mobility. We refer to subsidised employment whenever an individual exits to 
socially insured employment or self-employment in the context of an active labour market 
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program. Such programs mainly encompass subsidised jobs in the secondary labour market 
(ABM, SAM), subsidies for regular employment (Eingliederungszuschüsse, 
Beschäftigungshilfen) and subsidies for self-employment (Ich-AG, Überbrückungsgeld), but 
also contain more extensive training programs (FbW) if these programs count as socially 
insured employment. Table 1 describes the composition of all exits to subsidised employment 
observed in the IEBS for UPIT spells starting between 2000 and 2002. For the analysis, we 
decided to pool all forms of subsidised employment because robustness checks for 
distinguishing between certain types of programs did not yield noteworthy differences 
compared to pooling all programs. 
We restrict our analysis to unemployment periods starting in the period 2000-2002. This is 
because information on periods of subsidised employment is not available before 2000. Since 
we are able to observe information about unemployment up to 2004 while exits to 
employment are only observable up to the end of 2003, we decided to exclude spells starting 
in 2003. This reduces the amount of right censoring in the data and ensures a minimum 
observation period of one year. Table 2 shows the sample sizes and exit types when applying 
the UPIT definition and distinguishing individuals by their earning capacities. We also 
distinguish by gender and marital status as these characteristics are important determinants of 
individual labour market outcomes. 
 
TABLE 1 
 
Table 2 shows that individuals with low pre-unemployment wages are more likely to exit to 
subsidised employment and less likely to migrate than jobseekers with higher pre-
unemployment earnings. Moreover, the median unemployment duration is significantly 
longer for low wage earners, a finding that is in line with the expectations that the institutional 
framework creates disincentives for individuals with low earning capacities to take up a job. 
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Table 2 also indicates differences by gender and marital status. Singles are geographically 
more mobile than their married counterparts, a finding that is consistent with the migration 
literature regarding higher migration costs for married people with children (see Ghatak et al., 
1996). Differences between female and male singles, however, are very small. Since 
estimation results for both sub-groups proved to be very similar, we decided to pool male and 
female singles in the subsequent analysis. By contrast, results for married individuals strongly 
differ by gender. Married women have by far the longest median unemployment duration and 
the lowest exit rates. This probably reflects the looser labour force attachment of married 
women. Moreover, the extremely low migration rates among married women may reflect the 
fact that women are more likely to be tied to the local area if the male breadwinner is 
employed locally. Due to these particularities of labour market decision of married women, 
we decided to restrict the analysis to married males and single people only and differentiate 
these groups by their earning capacities.  
Individual-level covariates for the econometric analysis that are contained in the IEBS are 
age, education and a number of indicators of an individual’s employment history such as 
previous unemployment experiences, previous participation in active labour market programs 
and previous commuting status. These covariates are chosen to capture differences in job-
finding chances and migration costs that are relevant for the labour market outcomes of 
jobseekers. In addition, the analysis also includes the maximum length of unemployment 
benefit receipt at the beginning of unemployment. As previously discussed, entitlements to 
unemployment benefits increase with age and job tenure within some claim period. Since 
actual entitlements are not observed for many individuals in the IEBS, the missing 
information has been imputed based on known information concerning age and tenure in the 
previous job. Summary statistics of the samples can be found in Appendix A. 
 
TABLE 2 
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Regional aggregate data 
We use a broad number of regional indicators which are mainly provided by the two largest 
German data producers: the Federal Employment Agency and the Federal Statistical Office 
(FSO). The FEA data is coded at the level of employment agency districts and contains 
information about labour market tightness (e.g. vacancies, jobseekers, degree of long term 
unemployment), the extent and structure of local labour market programs and the organization 
of the local employment agency (e.g. number of staff). The FSO data contains county level 
information about the population structure (e.g. age, education), the type of region (urban vs. 
rural), its infrastructure and industrial structure. There are 180 employment agency districts 
and 440 counties in Germany, the exact delineation of which are shown in Arntz and Wilke 
(2007). We decided not to aggregate the regional data to labour market regions because for 
some indicators we only have spatially intensive data such as percentages that cannot be 
easily aggregated. 
The FSO and the FEA data provided us with more than 100 regional indicators, a full list of 
which is included in Arntz et al. (2006). For the purposes of econometric analysis, there are 
far too many regional covariates as there is a high degree of correlation among several of 
these regional indicators. Thus, as a first step we used a combination of cluster and factor 
analysis to identify indicators that contain very similar information. In a next step, we decided 
to compress the regional information further by grouping the remaining regional indicators 
according to economically reasonable groups that cover major regional factors that are likely 
to affect unemployment durations and the labour market state after unemployment as 
discussed in the theoretical framework. In particular, we create five groups and select up to 
five indicators as their representatives such that the correlation among the representatives is 
minimized. As a consequence, the chosen representatives proxy for their group of interest in 
the econometric analysis so that estimated coefficients reflect effects of the group they 
represent. Table 3 shows a description and summary statistics of all regional indicators. There 
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is a large regional variation in most of the indicators that describe the regional labour market 
situation. In fact, regional disparities in unemployment rates, for example, are among the 
largest in Europe (OECD, 2005). Thus, there should be enough regional variation to identify 
the effect of regional covariates on labour market outcomes. For the subsequent econometric 
analysis, we standardized all continuous regional variables to ease comparability of estimation 
results. 
The first group of indicators characterizes local labour demand and supply conditions, i.e. 
local job availability. The local unemployment rate may be considered as an indicator of 
deficient local labour demand. In addition, the change in the unemployment rate compared to 
the previous year conveys information about the development of the local imbalance of labour 
supply and demand. In regions with an excess supply of labour, the probability of receiving a 
job-offer should be reduced. As a reaction, reservation wages in all labour markets decrease 
since jobseekers become less choosy and search effort shifts from the local to alternative 
markets. This implies a decrease in the number of local jobs found and an increasing hazard 
of finding a non-local or a subsidised job. An excess supply of labour may also increase the 
availability of subsidised employment because corresponding labour market programs are 
often used to cushion unfavourable labour market conditions. 
Another important determinant of unemployment duration might be local economic 
performance since well-performing regions should offer a higher expected lifetime income 
and should thus attract search effort to the local market while non-local and subsidised 
employment should become less attractive. Well-performing and economically growing 
regions should be characterized by a high and growing GDP per head as well as by a high 
level of newly established businesses. The analysis thus includes corresponding indicators. 
Apart from economic conditions of the locality, its social structure may also shape individual 
labour market behaviour. In particular, individuals may have ”…lower incentives to work 
where peers are also unemployed ... and a view of joblessness as unproblematic within a 
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context of lowered aspirations, ...” (Ritchie et al., 2005:3). In Germany, discouraging social 
contexts might be found in old industrial regions which have experienced massive 
deindustrialisation in recent decades and a subsequent rise in long-term unemployment. We 
thus decided to include indicators such as the level of long-term unemployment and the 
average schooling level in the region to control for different social contexts. 
In addition, we use information about the institutional organization of the local employment 
agency. As discussed in section 2, there has been an increase in the number of job placement 
counsellors of around 30% during the period of observations. This politically motivated 
increase in the counsellor/customer ratio, i.e. the ratio between placement officers per 
jobseeker, provides some variation to identify the effect of an increasing level of job 
counselling. We hypothesize that a higher counsellor/customer ratio positively affects both 
local and the non-local job-finding probability, but that exits to subsidised employment might 
be reduced if subsidised employment to some extent substitutes for job counselling. We also 
include indicators of the local availability of labour market programs. As discussed in section 
2, there have been changes in the structure of labour market programs with a shift from 
measures aiming at the secondary labour market to programs that aim at integrating 
individuals into the regular labour market. We therefore include the share of unemployed 
participating in programs with a focus on the regular labour market such as training measures 
(FbW), programs targeted to young unemployed (JUMP)) and subsidies for regular 
employment or self-employment (Übergangsgeld, Eingliederungszuschuss, 
Beschäftigungshilfe) and also include the share of unemployed participating in programs with 
a focus on the secondary market such as work creation schemes (ABM, SAM).5 While exits to 
subsidised employment should be positively affected by the level of offered programs, the 
hazard of leaving the region may be negatively affected if such programs offer a substitute for 
leaving the region. Westerlund (1997, 1998), for example, finds evidence that an increasing 
number of participants in ALMP in the local region reduces flows of out migration in 
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Sweden. One explanation of such findings may be that participants in such programs reduce 
search efforts, especially in non-local labour markets, and thus experience lower mobility 
levels (Fredriksson and Johansson, 2003; Lindgren and Westerlund, 2003). In addition, an 
extensive local availability of ALMP may also reduce migration levels among unemployed 
who are not participating in such program if the availability of such programs distracts search 
effort from the non-local to the subsidised labour market. Arntz (2005) finds evidence for 
such mobility-reducing effects on female jobseekers in western Germany. We therefore 
include the level of offered programs in order to investigate possible locking-in effects.  
Finally, we include several structural indicators to characterize the type of region. In 
particular, we include a population density related classification to distinguish between rural 
and urban regions. Moreover, we use driving distance to the next higher level city as a proxy 
for the degree of remoteness of a region. Both of these characteristics affect the availability 
and the accessibility of employment and may thus change an individual's search behaviour. 
We also control for three other regional characteristics. Regions with a high level of seasonal 
work, proxied for by the flow in and out of unemployment, may be characterized by a large 
share of short unemployment spells. Secondly, the local existence of third level institutions 
may affect the composition of the available workforce. The availability of a highly flexible 
workforce such as students may affect the competition for certain jobs and thus affect the flow 
out of unemployment. Finally, we include the local availability of child care support in order 
to analyse whether the public infrastructure affects unemployment experiences of jobseekers 
with children. The availability of kindergarten or nursery school might reduce the opportunity 
cost of local employment and thus accelerate exits to local employment. 
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5 Methodological issues 
Let )(tF  be the unemployment duration distribution, where t  is the duration of 
unemployment. The hazard rate, ))(1/(}/)({)( tFttFth −∂∂= , is an intuitive way of 
formalizing transitions from unemployment to employment. In our econometric analysis we 
use a hazard rate model to investigate the effect of various covariates },{ 21 xxx = on the 
distribution of unemployment, where 1x  denotes the set of individual characteristics such as 
demographics, socio-economics, work history variables and firm-level variables, while 
2x contains all remaining regional indicators. In particular, we estimate a competing-risk Cox-
proportional hazard model6, ),exp()()|( 21 xxtxth jjjj βαλ +=  where j denotes the exits to 
local regular employment, subsidised employment and non-local employment, i.e. migration, 
and jλ  is the destination-specific baseline hazard rate. 
There are several major sources of biases that have to be addressed when using this approach. 
First of all, there may be biases from unobserved individual heterogeneity. As suggested by 
Meyer (1990), however, unobserved individual heterogeneity may not have much of an effect 
if there is a flexible baseline hazard that partly absorbs this heterogeneity. Secondly, there 
may be a simultaneity issue of the regional covariates if an exit directly affects the covariates 
used in the analysis. This may be the case if an exit to local employment reduces the 
unemployment rate or if an exit to subsidised employment increases the offer rate for active 
labour market programs. For this reason, all regional covariates have been calculated as the 
average value for the 12 months preceding the start of unemployment. Estimation results may, 
however, still be biased if regional characteristics that are correlated to the observed 
covariates are omitted. In the literature, this problem has been addressed by stratification (see 
Ridder and Tunali, 1999). When stratifying according to regional labour markets, separate 
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baseline hazards are estimated for each regional labour market. This approach resembles the 
well-known fixed effects approach and thus controls for unobserved heterogeneity at the level 
of regional labour markets. Unfortunately, our data is limited to a relatively short time span. 
Thus, a stratified estimation approach turns out to be infeasible since, in this case, 
identification rests on time variation. We are nonetheless fairly confident that biases from 
omitted regional characteristics may be negligible due to the rich account of regional 
covariates used in the analysis. 
As has been discussed by Thomas (1996), in a competing-risk duration analysis, the estimated 
parameter vector ( jj βα , ) may not be interpreted as the effect on the duration until exit to 
state j. Instead, the effect on this duration depends on parameter vectors for all states. In 
particular, define the conditional cumulative probability of exiting to state j until t as 
dtxtGxthxt j
t
j ))|(1)(|()|( 0 −=Π ∫  with )(sh j  as the exit hazard to state j and ))(1( sG−  as 
the overall survival probability that takes account of all exit options. In our empirical analysis 
we evaluate the estimates at  }0,{ ll xx ∈  , where we choose the average values of all 
individual level variables ( 11 xx = ) and we choose zero for the regional variables ( 02 =x ).7 
We estimate the probability of exiting to state j as the duration elapses one year, i.e. 
)|365( xjΠ . We compute the marginal effects  kj xx ∂Π∂ /)|365(   as the marginal change of 
the cumulative probability of exiting to state j during the first year if one regressor kx  
changes. This outcome is of particular political interest because long-term unemployment 
starts after one year of unemployment. Thus, our marginal effects correspond to the change in 
probability of becoming long-term unemployed that is due to a marginal increase of 
covariate k .8 Based on 500 samples, we estimate the standard error of the conditional 
marginal effect bootstrap distribution. Assuming that standard errors are distributed normally, 
we then determine the significance level of the estimated marginal effects. 
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6 Results 
Tables 4 and 5 present the estimated conditional marginal effects for single people and 
married men of low and higher earning capacities. We generally find that the individual work-
history seems to be the driving force behind the duration of unemployment, a result that is 
similar to Lüdemann et al. (2006) and Fitzenberger and Wilke (2007) who use data without 
information on subsidised employment and on migration. Our results also indicate some 
convergence of the conditional distribution of unemployment duration in western and eastern 
Germany during the years 2000-2004. Compared to the impact of individual characteristics, 
regional disparities only marginally affect the length of unemployment periods in Germany as 
has also been suggested by Arntz (2005) who uses data without information on subsidised 
employment. Thus, although some regional factors significantly affect both the 
unemployment duration and the likelihood of ending up in a specific destination state, our 
results suggest that the recent emphasis on regional policies, regionally tailored policy mixes 
and the organization of public employment services is unlikely to bring about a substantial 
reduction in the length of unemployment in Germany. Rather, there is some evidence that 
certain regional policies such as the local provision of active labour market programs may 
even yield negative labour market outcomes. In what follows we present a detailed discussion 
of the estimation results for the individual-specific covariates before turning to the regional 
covariates. In line with the finding that regional covariates have only a limited impact on 
individual labour market outcomes, we also find only few general and robust result patterns  
across the four sub-groups. A detailed discussion of each single effect thus seems an 
infeasible approach for the regional covariates. Instead, we only focus on the most important 
results for each group of regional covariates and point to the most interesting and robust 
differences across the sub-samples. 
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Socio-demographics 
Several socio-economic variables significantly affect the duration of unemployment9, but only 
few of them have a strong effect. Among the most important for all exit states of single people 
and married men alike is age. Generally, the probability of finding regular employment in 
either the local or the non-local area decreases with age. For low-earning individuals aged 46-
56, the reduced probability of finding regular employment is partially compensated by a 
higher probability of entering subsidised employment. Those aged 56 and above experience 
lower exit probabilities to all exit types and thus stay unemployed significantly longer than 
their younger counterparts. Once having controlled for different levels of pre-unemployment 
wages, the effect of educational attainment on the duration of unemployment is rather limited. 
Instead, the educational degree rather has some impact on the observed exit state after 
unemployment. In particular, a university degree markedly reduces the probability of finding 
local regular employment, but increases the likelihood of entering subsidised employment or 
migration if they are single. The resulting probability of leaving unemployment to any of 
these exit states within one year thus tends to be slightly lower only than for their unskilled 
counterparts. Lower pre-unemployment earnings associated with higher income replacement 
rates rather than the observed educational degree thus seem to be able to explain the high 
share of long term unemployment among the unskilled in Germany. This finding also 
confirms our approach of stratifying the sample with respect to the pre-unemployment wage 
level. 
 
Work history variables 
Characteristics associated with the work history have the strongest influence on the 
unemployment duration distribution and effects are typically similar for all samples. In 
Page 25 of 55
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cres Email: regional.studies@fm.ru.nl
Regional Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 26 
particular, long entitlement periods for unemployment benefits (UB) are associated with a 
much lower likelihood of finding regular employment either in the local or the non-local 
region, especially among individuals with higher pre-unemployment wages. One reason for 
why UB entitlements have a weaker effect on individuals with low pre-unemployment wages 
may be that these individuals often receive complementary social benefits. In this case, 
prolonging unemployment benefits does not result in additional transfer payments as the 
income replacement rate is the same irrespective of whether receiving UB or unemployment 
assistance (UA). For those with higher pre-unemployment earnings, longer UB entitlements 
may instead be quite beneficial as income replacement rates for this group should be higher 
for UB than for UA. In line with our findings, the disincentive effect from longer UB 
entitlements should be stronger for individuals with higher pre-unemployment earnings. 
Another interesting finding concerns extremely long UB entitlements of more than 2 years 
which apply only to older unemployed who already have much lower exit probabilities than 
their younger counterparts. These individuals basically never leave unemployment again but 
use their long entitlements to unemployment benefits as a means of early retirement. 
We also obtain strong results if an unemployed person was already subsidised by the local 
employment agency before the start of the current unemployment period. If these individuals 
slip back into unemployment they have a very low transition probability to either local or 
non-local regular employment. Instead, a high percentage of these individuals ends up in 
another subsidised employment period. With the new generation of individual administrative 
data we are therefore able to identify what is typically called a ”career of labour market 
measures”.10 Our results therefore suggest that both passive and active labour market 
measures are strongly associated with negative individual labour market outcomes. We do 
not, however, read this as a pure causal relationship because these results may partially be 
driven by unobserved factors such as a selection of immobile unemployed into subsidised 
employment or long entitlements to UB. 
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Furthermore, we identify several factors that increase exit probabilities among the 
unemployed. Individuals who have previously been recalled by their former employer, have 
much shorter unemployment periods due to faster local exits. Moreover, this group is less 
likely to be subsidised or to migrate, and this suggests that recalls are related to seasonal 
unemployment and temporary lay-offs. Being in minor employment11 at the beginning of the 
unemployment period considerably increases local job finding and reduces the likelihood of 
migration in many cases. Working in a minor employment signals some labour force 
attachment, but may also increase the attachment to the local area. Individuals who commuted 
to their last job have lower local but higher non-local employment probabilities. This may 
capture both a higher propensity to migrate as well as a higher propensity to commute very 
long distances. 
 
TABLE 4 
 
Supply and demand conditions 
As expected, a deficient local labour demand as reflected in high and increasing 
unemployment levels tends to reduce the probability of finding employment locally within 
one year among all groups. Among single people with higher pre-unemployment wages, this 
detrimental effect on the duration of unemployment is partially offset by higher migration 
levels while their married counterparts increasingly enter subsidised employment in regions 
with an excess supply of labour. For individuals with low pre-unemployment wages, such 
counteracting effects are even smaller or absent so that this group appears to be more reliant 
on local labour market conditions. Similar to the findings by Arntz (2005), the results thus 
indicate some heterogeneity among different groups of unemployed individuals with respect 
to the responsiveness to regional labour demand conditions. Moreover, the fact that 
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significantly higher migration levels can only be found for well-earning singles in response to 
deteriorating unemployment rates during the previous five years suggests that such 
counteracting forces tend to be slow, a result that is in line with slow adjustment processes 
after region-specific shocks (Decressin and Fatàs, 1995; Möller, 1995). Thus, deteriorating 
local labour demand conditions seem to result in a growing share of long-term unemployed. 
 
Economic performance 
The indicators that proxy for the local economic performance do not show any robust pattern 
across the different groups of unemployed. The only exception is the strong and positive 
effect of the setting up of new local businesses on the likelihood of finding local employment 
within one year for individuals with low earning capacities. One reason for this positive effect 
may be that new firms tend to offer precarious jobs which are a more relevant type of 
employment for individuals on the fringe of the labour market. Apart from this noteworthy 
effect, the effects of other local indicators of economic performance are negligible. We 
therefore conclude that local economic performance does not seem to be an important 
determinant of labour market outcomes for jobseekers in Germany, one explanation of which 
may be that due to central wage bargaining regional productivity levels as reflected in local 
GDP do not translate into behaviourally relevant interregional wage differences.  
 
TABLE 5 
 
Social structure 
Indicators of the local social structure mainly confirm the theoretical notion that the social 
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context affects job search behaviour. As expected, a high share of long-term unemployment 
significantly prolongs the duration of unemployment as the strong decrease in local exits is 
only marginally offset by increasing exits to non-local and subsidised employment. A low 
average schooling level comes with similar but less strong effects. We conclude that a 
discouraging social context indeed prolongs unemployment, but that there is no evidence that 
overall search effort is reduced. At least for some individuals, migration and exits to 
subsidised employment offer an alternative to continued unemployment. 
 
Institutional organization 
According to our findings, the recent emphasis on job counselling that is, among other things, 
reflected in the increasing number of job counsellors per unemployed jobseeker, is unlikely to 
substantially contribute to a shortening of unemployment duration. This is because a higher 
counsellor/customer ratio does not significantly accelerate exits from unemployment but 
rather affects the labour market state after unemployment. In particular, individuals with 
higher pre-unemployment earnings are more likely to migrate and to exit to subsidised 
employment while there are less local exits in regions with a higher ratio of job counsellors to 
unemployed jobseekers. This may suggest that additional human resources in job counselling 
speed up exits to migration and subsidised employment at the cost of local placement without 
resulting in a positive net effect on the duration of unemployment. Similarly, we also find that 
an extensive local availability of labour market programs accelerates exits to subsidised 
employment at the expense of exits to regular employment.12 Among single people, we 
mainly observe less local exits, while among married men with higher earning capacities, 
subsidised employment rather substitutes for non-local employment. There therefore seems to 
be a small regional locking-in effect of active labour market policies for married men, but not 
for single people that complements the findings from Arntz (2005) concerning a regional 
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locking-in effect for women in western Germany. 
 
Structural indicators 
The type of region as well as the driving time to the next large city captures major differences 
in the availability of employment opportunities within a commuting range. As the type of 
available jobs may differ depending on the type of region, this may explain the heterogeneous 
result pattern across sub-samples. Rural regions, for example, tend to increase the local job 
finding chances of individuals with higher earning capacities, but have the opposite effect on 
low wage earners. This may be due to a lack of unskilled service jobs in rural areas. 
Subsidised employment partially cushions these differences with increasing exit probabilities 
in rural regions among low earning married men and decreasing exit probabilities for 
individuals with higher pre-unemployment earnings. Moreover, apart from single people with 
high earning capacities, all other groups show higher local exit probabilities in remotely 
located regions. This may suggest that relatively immobile groups of unemployed lower their 
reservation wage in regions with a lack of accessible jobs and thus experience faster exits to 
local employment. 
The presence of a university reduces local job-finding among all groups and increases 
migration probabilities among all but married men with low earning capacities. These results 
are in line with the idea that students may exert additional congestion effects on the local 
labour market as students seek a minor job during their studies and often start their job search 
after graduation in the local area. Finally, somewhat unexpectedly, a higher level of day care 
places per child weakly accelerates local exits among married men, but not among single 
parents although single parents are somewhat less likely to leave a region with an extensive 
child care infrastructure. Thus, there is no evidence that the availability of public 
infrastructure strongly affects the duration of unemployment. 
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Western/eastern Germany 
Despite strong economic differences between western and eastern Germany, conditional 
unemployment durations are surprisingly similar. On the one hand, this suggests that our 
regional labour market characteristics already capture major economic differences between 
both parts of Germany. Since the effect of these regional characteristics are relatively limited, 
however, the much higher level of unemployment in eastern Germany and the long average 
duration of unemployment have to be explained by the huge inflow into unemployment just 
after reunification and the fact that many of these displaced workers never found regular 
employment rather than by unemployment experiences of those currently entering 
unemployment. For those entering unemployment between 2000 and 2002, differences 
between the conditional unemployment duration in eastern and western Germany are small 
and in many cases even disappear as we reach the end of the observation period. With regard 
to subsidised employment this is probably due to a reduction in the formerly extensive public 
spending on subsidised employment in eastern Germany. The likelihood of exiting to local 
regular employment, however, remains somewhat lower for most unemployed people in 
eastern Germany than for unemployed people in western Germany. This is partially 
compensated for by higher migration rates among the unemployed from eastern Germany 
which can be explained by the strong pull factors from western Germany. 
7 Conclusions and Implications 
In the light of recent labour market reforms, this paper explores the extent to which the 
unemployment compensation system, the local organization of job placement and regional 
policies determine the duration of unemployment in Germany. For this purpose, we perform a 
comprehensive analysis of unemployment duration using the latest generation of 
administrative individual data and a broad set of regional aggregate data in the period 2000-
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2004. By distinguishing three exit states, local regular employment, non-local regular 
employment and subsidised employment, we are able to disentangle the effects of individual, 
regional and institutional characteristics on these destination states. This is highly relevant 
because such characteristics often have diverging effects on the three destination states. As a 
consequence, previous estimates may have been biased if non-local and subsidised 
employment has not been separated from exits to local employment. Unfortunately, our data 
do not allow to distinguishing further between destination states such as leaving the labour 
force or retirement. Including such destination states in future research thus is an important 
extension of our competing risks analysis in order to further reduce remaining biases. 
Based on competing-risk Cox proportional hazard estimates, we generally obtain that 
individual characteristics and in particular an individual's work history strongly affect the 
duration of unemployment and the chosen destination state while the effect of regional factors 
such as the unemployment rate is often rather small. This is consistent with German and 
international evidence concerning the impact of regional labour market conditions on the 
duration of unemployment until exiting to a local or non-local job (Kettunen, 2002; Yankow, 
2002; Arntz, 2005). Regional disparities thus appear to be much less important than usually 
considered by the German public and by German policy makers. Even between western and 
eastern Germany, the conditional unemployment duration is very similar. Therefore, our 
results suggest that regional policies may only be a supplementary means of improving labour 
market outcomes of unemployed individuals.  
With regard to public counselling, there is no evidence that increasing counselling efforts 
have much of a shortening effect on the duration of unemployment. These results may 
indicate that recent restructuring efforts of public employment services are unlikely to bring 
about a substantial reduction in unemployment. Nonetheless, restructuring efforts may 
contribute to the increasing efficiency of public spending, an aspect that we do not analyse in 
our work. For this reason and given our econometric approach it is difficult to compare our 
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results directly with international evaluation studies which are available for several countries, 
e.g. the UK (Blundell et al., 2004) and the Netherlands (van den Berg and van den Klaauw, 
2006). 
Entering subsidised employment in the context of an active labour market program (ALMP) 
often tends to cushion negative local labour market conditions and thus somewhat counteracts 
a prolonged unemployment duration. Moreover, previous ALMP participants are likely to end 
up in ALMP again, a result which likely reflects a selection of immobile individuals into what 
we might call ALMP-careers. Our analysis thus does not identify the causal effect of 
participating in ALMP on labour market outcomes which may be positive depending on the 
type of program as has been suggested by Lindgren and Westerlund (2003). Our analysis 
suggests, however, that an extensive local supply of ALMP reduces migration rates for 
married men. We thus find evidence for a minor regional locking-in-effect that complements 
the finding from Arntz (2005) concerning a similar effect for female jobseekers in western 
Germany. An evaluation of ALMP with regard to its effect on unemployment durations 
should thus also take account of such negative labour market outcomes that prolong 
unemployment among jobseekers. 
We obtain a number of indications that the unemployment compensation and welfare system 
strongly affects individual labour market outcomes: 
• Individuals with low pre-unemployment earnings and thus high income replacement 
rates have the lowest exit hazards to both local and non-local regular employment. 
• Exits to regular employment decrease with increasing entitlement length to 
unemployment benefits, especially among previously well-earning unemployed for 
whom the threat of entitlement loss after exhausting unemployment benefits is largest. 
• Older individuals with extremely long UB entitlements basically never leave for 
regular employment as they use UB as a means of early retirement. 
We therefore conclude that the reduction of UB entitlements and income replacement rates 
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are likely to drastically shorten unemployment for certain groups. A strong effect of the 
unemployment compensation system on the duration of unemployment has already been 
observed in the past. Christensen (2005) shows that social benefit recipients with high 
reservation wages are unlikely to leave unemployment. Similarly, Fitzenberger and Wilke 
(2007) find that unemployed people with lower former wages are much less likely to leave 
unemployment. Müller et al. (2007) evaluate a reform of the unemployment benefit system in 
1997 which reduced entitlement length for unemployment benefits for older unemployed. 
They show that this reform was successful in drastically reducing inflow to unemployment 
and the duration of unemployment in the relevant group of unemployed. On the other hand, 
less generous unemployment compensation may result in a reduction of job stability and post-
unemployment wages if a generous transfer receipt allows for identifying better job matches 
by enabling longer search periods. Recent findings from Fitzenberger and Wilke (2004) and 
(2007) do not find empirical evidence for such impacts of the German unemployment 
benefits. Still, additional future research concerning the impact of regional and institutional 
factors on the quality of job matches is highly relevant as a complement to this paper.
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Appendix A - Summary Statistics by sub-samples 
 
Singles Married Men 
 
Low Wage Higher Wage Low Wage Higher Wage 
Individual characteristics    
Female                                 41.7 26.0 n/a 
Age <26                              41.4 21.2 4.4 2.5 
Age 26-35                              27.4 39.1 23.5 24.6 
Age 46-56                              10.5 12.0 30.6 28.5 
Age >56                            1.8 2.0 8.0 7.0 
Unskilled                              52.2 30.5 45.9 32.4 
University degree                      1.6 7.2 1.5 5.6 
Foreign born                           6.2 5.3 16.9 12.4 
Female foreign born                   2.2 1.1 n/a 
Children                               21.2 18.0 63.1 66.7 
Children & female                     11.6 4.8   
Minor job                              8.6 1.0 8.8 1.3 
Spell starts in winter  32.0 39.1 37.6 45.2 
Previous employment history                
Part time                              20.3 4.6 n/a 
Lower / upper wage z 39.5 22.9 26.6 27.8 
Lower/upper wage & female 18.6 6.7 n/a 
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Construction                           4.3 2.8 6.5 4.3 
Trade and Food Ind.                   14.7 26.2 25.8 35.7 
Services/Public sector                44.2 33.8 38.2 29.0 
Recall                                 12.2 20.2 19.9 28.3 
Unemployment                          61.9 64.9 74.9 66.8 
Large firm                             7.0 10.3 5.1 7.0 
BE 6-12 mths                           43.4 49.2 31.5 39.7 
BE 12-18 mths                          1.1 2.0 3.4 4.5 
BE 18-24 mths                          0.9 2.2 3.3 5.7 
BE >24 mths                          0.9 2.2 3.7 7.0 
ALMP measure                          9.4 1.5 12.5 1.3 
Commuter                               20.8 27.7 20.8 29.2 
Number of unemployment 
spells          
74,724 28,168 28,018 23,620 
 
Note: All covariates are dummy variables. BE=Benefit entitlements; ALMP= Active labour 
market programs; Minor Job = Job < 15 hrs/week while unemployed at the beginning of 
unemployment 
z: Refers to individuals with daily pre-unemployment wages in the lowest (highest) wage 
quartile for the low (higher) wage sample. 
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Table 1: Composition of exits to subsidised employment, IEBS, 2000-2002 
 
Subsidy for ... Number % 
... employment in secondary market 10,391 31.0 
... regular employment 9,643 28.7 
... self-employment 9,001 26.8 
... training measure 2,146 6.4 
... other programsa 2,379 7.1 
Total subsidised employment 33,560 100.0 
a
 This category refers to a mix of programs that can be autonomously designed by each 
employment agency. As an example, these measures include subsidies for entering vocational 
training or a premium for extending working hours of an existing job (BA, 2002). 
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Table 2: Unemployment duration and exit types by gender, marital status and pre-
unemployment wages, IEBS, 2000-2002 
 
 Low wagea Higher wagea 
 Men Women Men Women 
Singles  
% exit to  
local employment        48.1 (70.3)  51.3 (74.0)  57.9 (74.5)  53.5 (70.5)  
non-local employment     6.4 (9.4)    5.6 (8.1)    9.1 (11.7)  10.3 (13.6)  
subsidised employment 13.9 (20.3)  12.4 (17.9)  10.7 (13.8)  12.1 (15.9)  
all exits               68.4 (100.0) 69.3 (100.0) 77.7 (100.0) 75.9 (100.0) 
Unemployment spells  
Median duration (days) 138    146    107    123   
Number of spells  43,528 31,206 20,849 7,319 
Married  
% exit to  
local employment       47.5 (64.9)  44.6 (60.9)   58.7 (73.3)   45.9 (72.6)   
non-local employment    5.8 (7.9)    2.8 (3.4)     8.0 (10.0)    4.6 (7.3)    
subsidised employment  19.9 (27.2)  14.7 (20.1)   13.4 (16.7)   12.7 (20.1)   
all exits             73.2 (100.0)   62.1 (100.0)  80.1 (100.0)  63.2 (100.0) 
Unemployment spells  
Median duration (days) 176    238     116   194   
Number of spells       28,018 31,088 23,620 5,483 
a
 Low wages refers to individuals with pre-unemployment daily gross wages of less than 60 
euros, while higher wages denote pre-unemployment earnings above this threshold. 
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Table 3: Description and summary statistics of regional covariates, 2000-2003 
 
No.  Group Indicator Sourcea Mean SD 
I Demand / supply Unemployment rate                         A 10.7    5.0    
 
 Change of unemployment rate (pp)          A 0.04    0.71   
II Economic performance GDP per employee (euros)                  B 49818.5 8891.4 
 
 Change of GDP per employee 1995-2000 (%) B  2.4    1.6   
 
 New businesses set up per 1,000 residents C 13.8    2.7    
III Social structure Share of long term Ub (%)     A 33.7    6.7   
 
 Avg. years of schooling                   B 14.6    0.13   
IV Institutional organization Placement counsellor/100 unemployed A 0.24    0.05   
 
 Share of unemployed in ALMPb with focus on 
   
 
 - Regular labour market - ALMPR (%) A 17.6   3.9  
 
 - Secondary labour market - ALMPS (%) A  5.9   5.8  
V Structural indicators Driving time to next large city (min.) B 104.8 53.8  
 
 
Child care places per child B  0.62  0.12 
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  University present B  0.36  0.48 
  Type of the region (reference: sub-urban): 
   
  - rural B 0.29 0.45 
  - urban B 0.39 0.49 
  Flow of U per 1,000 employees A 32.2 11.1 
a
 A: FEA (Bundesagentur für Arbeit); B: FSO (Statistisches Bundesamt); C: Institut für Mittelstandsforschung, Bonn. 
b
 ALMP=Active labour market programs; U=Unemployment.
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Table 4: Marginal effects in percentage points on the conditional cumulative probability of exiting to 
local, subsidised or non-local employment, Singles 
 
 Low wage Higher wage 
Variable local subsidised non-local local subsidised non-local 
Individual characteristics 
      
Female 7.6***   -0.8*  0.6*  2.9**  -0.5        2.1***   
Age <26       16.7***  -0.9***  1.2***  11.7***  -2.2***  0.0         
Age 26-35  3.7***   0.4*   1.1***  4.2***   0.7*   1.0***   
Age 46-56   -9.6***  1.5***   -0.9*** -4.5***  0.2         -0.2        
Age >56 -22.2*** -0.8        -1.7*** -12.2*** -5.4***  -0.1        
Unskilled -3.0***  0.5***   0.2        -2.8***  0.0         1.4***   
University degree -2.6        3.0***   3.6***  -9.8***  3.2***   1.6***   
Foreign born  -1.4        -1.0** 0.6        -3.8***  -1.3        -1.3***  
Female foreign born  -2.1        -1.9** -1.4*** -1.1        1.5         -1.4        
Children -2.1***  0.7***   -0.1       -1.8*  0.4         0.4         
Children & female   -4.7***  -0.2        -2.2*** -1.7        1.1         -2.6***  
Minor job 9.2***   0.0         -0.4* 3.9         1.5         -3.4***  
Spell starts in winter  4.7***   0.8***   0.2        7.1***   -1.0***  0.2         
Previous employment history 
      
Part time -5.3***  -0.9***  0.0         5.0***    -1.2*  2.4***   
Lower/upper wagez -2.7***  1.1***   -0.5***  -5.2***   1.6***   4.5***   
Lower/upper wagez & female 0.8         -0.2        0.6**  2.2          0.7         -0.8** 
Construction 8.5***   -1.2***  -0.8***  10.3***   -1.9*  -2.2***  
Trade and Food Ind. 7.7***   -0.6** -0.1        3.8***    0.8         -2.0***  
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Services/Public sector 3.8***   -0.5***  0.6***   -3.4***   1.7***   -0.5** 
Previously recalled 15.7***  -1.7***  -0.4** 14.8***   -4.6***  0.4         
Previously unemployed 1.3***   1.0***   -0.4***  1.9***    -0.4        0.0         
Large firm -2.7***  -1.2***  0.2         -5.9***   -1.6***  0.7**  
BE 6-12 mths 3.7***   0.3         0.1         -2.7***   2.2***   -1.2***  
BE 12-18 mths -1.0        0.5         0.2         -9.7***   2.5**  -1.5***  
BE 18-24 mths -3.7        0.9         -1.1*  -15.1***  4.0***   -2.9***  
BE $>24$ mths -21.0*** -1.7** -1.9***  -28.2***  1.6         -4.7***  
ALMP measure -31.1*** 7.2***   -2.0***  -25.2***  12.7***  -1.8***  
Commuter -4.6***  0.3*   5.6 ***  -11.8***  0.7*   8.0***   
Regional characteristics 
      
Unemployment rate (UR)              
-2.3**  0.6         0.0         -0.5        -1.8** 1.0         
Change in UR 1995-2000              
-1.5***   0.5***   0.2         -3.3***  0.7**  0.7***   
GDP per head                         
-0.5         -0.2        0.2         -0.7        0.3         0.4**  
Change of GDP 1995-2000             0.7***    0.1         -0.2***  0.3         -0.5***  -0.2** 
Rate of business set ups             1.1***    -0.2*  0.0         -0.2        0.2         0.3*   
Share of long-term U                 
-1.9***   -0.4** 0.2         -3.2***  0.7**  0.9***   
Avg. yrs of schooling                1.8***    -0.2        -0.5***  0.6         -0.3        -0.4** 
Placement counsellor per U           0.2          -0.4** 0.4***   -1.2** -0.2        1.6***   
Share of U in ALMP_R               0.1          0.5***   -0.1        -0.1        0.6*   -0.1        
Share of U in ALMP_S               
-1.4***   0.9***   0.1         -1.5** 1.1***   0.0         
Driving time to higher level city    0.8***    -0.2        -0.2*  -0.2        0.1         0.2         
Child care places & child  0.3 -0.3*   -0.4***  0.4         0.4          -0.1       
University present                   
-2.6***   0.1         0.4 ***  -1.8***  -0.3        1.0***   
Seasonal unemployment                
-0.2         0.2         0.1         -2.5*  1.8*   0.0         
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Rural region                         
-1.8***   0.0         0.2         1.6*   -1.4***  0.2         
Urban region                         
-0.1         1.0***   -0.9***  1.6**  -0.6        -0.4        
West & 2000                       8.6***    0.5         1.4***   9.9***   -1.1*  1.0**  
West & 2000 & female           0.4          0.0         0.0         1.3         -0.3        -1.0** 
West & 2001                       2.5***    1.2**  0.3         0.1         0.5         0.8         
West & 2001 & female           2.0*    0.2         0.5         1.7         -0.8        0.0         
East & 2000                       
-3.8***   2.0**  3.7***   -7.8***  2.3         11.3***  
East & 2000 & female           
-6.5***   0.0         -0.7** 1.6         -2.1*  -2.7***  
East & 2001                       
-2.0         0.5         3.6***   -5.4***  1.7         6.8***   
East & 2001 & female           
-6.0***   0.3         -1.0***  -1.8        -1.3        -1.5** 
East & 2002                       0.1          0.0         2.6***   -2.3        1.5         3.1***   
East & 2002 & female 
           
-6.6***  0.0       -1.1***  -0.2     0.5         -1.5***  
Note: Low wages refers to individuals with pre-unemployment daily gross wages of less than 60 euros. BE=Benefit 
entitlements; ALMP=Active labour market program with focus on regular (R) or secondary (S) employment; 
U=Unemployment 
z: Refers to individuals with daily pre-unemployment wages in the lowest (highest) wage quartile for the low 
(higher) wage sample. 
Significance levels: *: 10%  **:5%  ***:1% 
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Table 5: Marginal effects in percentage points on the conditional cumulative probability of exiting to 
local, subsidised or non-local employment, Married Men 
 
 Low wage Higher wage 
Variable local subsidised non-local local subsidised non-local 
Individual characteristics 
      
Age <26                             10.2***  0.0        0.8*  1.9         0.1        -0.2       
Age 26-35                               2.1 ***  0.5        0.5** 2.3***   -0.3       -0.1       
Age 46-56                               -8.3***  2.8***  -0.8*** -5.7***  0.0        0.0        
Age >56 -22.1*** 0.5        -2.2*** -20.6*** -5.6*** -1.2*** 
Unskilled -3.4***  1.1***  0.0        -1.5** -1.5*** 0.1        
University degree -7.0***  3.6***  0.1        -10.0*** 2.5***  0.4        
Foreign born                            -2.0***  -1.5*** 0.3        -5.7***  -2.8*** 0.8** 
Children -0.5        0.2        -0.1       -0.6        0.0        -0.2       
Minor job 13.9***  -0.4       -0.6       9.0***   1.0        -2.9*** 
Spell starts in winter  10.0***  0.4        0.2        11.3***  -2.7*** 0.1        
Previous employment history 
 
Part time -4.6***  -0.9** -0.4        n/a 
Lower/upper wagez -8.2***  0.8**  -0.5***  -5.7***  2.8***  2.7***  
Construction 16.6***  -1.8***  -0.3        16.0***  -3.4*** -2.8*** 
Trade and Food Ind. 12.0***  -1.0** 0.2         6.5***   -0.2       -1.0*** 
Services/Public sector 6.9***   -0.6*  0.8***   -0.4        1.9***  -0.1       
Previously recalled 12.3***  -2.1***  -0.3        16.1***  -5.5*** -0.5* 
Previously unemployed 1.8**  1.2***   0.1         1.6*   -0.4       0.3        
Large firm -7.1***  0.5         -0.4        -4.5***  -1.9*** -0.2       
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BE 6-12 mths 1.2*   0.7**  -0.3*  -1.3*  1.7***  -0.6*** 
BE 12-18 mths 1.2         -0.5        -0.2        -6.9***  3.1***  -1.3*** 
BE 18-24 mths -1.2        1.1         -0.3        -9.0***  2.3***  -1.4*** 
BE $>24$ mths -8.9***  -3.1***  -1.4***  -27.3*** 0.2        -3.1*** 
ALMP measure -28.4*** 7.2***   -1.8***  -29.2*** 15.2*** -1.8*** 
Commuter -3.9***  -0.4        5.2***   -13.4*** 0.4        8.9***  
Regional characteristics 
      
Unemployment rate (UR)               0.1         -1.3** 0.2         -4.5** 1.0         -0.1        
Change in UR 1995-2000               
-1.3***  0.1         -0.1        -4.3***  0.8**  0.1         
GDP per head                         0.5         0.0         -0.2        -0.6        -0.3        0.2         
Change of GDP 1995-2000             0.5         -0.1        0.1         0.4         0.4         -0.2        
Rate of business set ups             1.3 ***  -0.2        0.0         -0.3        0.2         -0.1        
Share of long-term U                 
-3.7***  0.5*   -0.2        -3.0***  0.3         0.7***   
Avg. yrs of schooling                
-1.1** -0.6** -0.4***  0.9         -0.1        -0.2        
Placement counsellor per U           
-1.8***  0.2         0.3*   -2.6***  0.6*   1.4 ***  
Share of U in ALMP_R               0.5         0.1         -0.3***  0.3         0.3         -0.5***  
Share of U in ALMP_S               0.0         0.4*   -0.1        0.6         0.8**  -0.6***  
Driving time to higher level city    1.1***   0.0         -0.2*  0.6         -0.2        -0.2** 
Child care places & child   0.8*   -0.9***  0.2*   0.9         -0.4        0.0         
University present                   
-2.3***  0.2         0.4*   -2.2***  -0.5        0.0         
Saisonal unemployment                
-3.2***  3.1***   0.0         -2.5        0.4         1.5 ** 
Rural region                         
-0.4        0.2         0.4         2.9***   -1.3** -0.4*  
Urban region                         1.4         0.1         -0.4** -0.2        -0.4        -0.6***  
West & 2000                       13.5***  -1.1*  1.1***   6.9***   -1.6***  0.9**  
West & 2001                       4.4***   -1.3** 0.3         -1.9*  -0.3        0.4         
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East & 2000                       
-3.3        6.3***   1.5*   -5.9** -0.8        8.6***   
East & 2001                       
-0.8        3.4**  1.4*   -4.9** -0.1        7.3***   
East & 2002                       2.8         3.2***   1.5**  -2.9        1.0         4.1***   
Note: Low wages refers to individuals with pre-unemployment daily gross wages of less than 60 euros. BE=Benefit 
entitlements; ALMP=Active labour market program with focus on regular (R) or secondary (S) employment; 
U=Unemployment 
z: Refers to individuals with daily pre-unemployment wages in the lowest (highest) wage quartile for the low (higher) 
wage sample. 
Significance levels : *: 10%  **: 5%  ***: 1% 
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1
 The ALG II provides almost the same level of benefits as former social benefits, while it is 
below the UA for individuals with high pre-unemployment earnings. The unemployment 
insurance based UB was basically left untouched. 
 
2
 Alternatively, one may assume some sort of sequential search strategy (Salop, 1973; McCall 
and McCall, 1987). Accordingly, an unemployed job seeker searches sequentially according 
to the expected returns from searching a particular market segment. 
 
3
 Regular employment can be further differentiated by the number of hours worked or the type 
of job contract (temporary versus unlimited). However, the data we use does not contain the 
relevant information such that we pool all types of regular employment. 
 
4
 The use of the SHStat was confined to the research project Evaluation of the 
experimentation clause § 6c SGB II which was funded by the German Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs. No scientific use file exists for this unique data set such that apart from the 
comparison of both data sets, no further analysis could be conducted. For more details on the 
comparison of the data sets see Arntz et al. (2006). 
 
 
5
 Further differentiating the program types is problematic as we often found a high degree of 
correlation between similar program types. 
 
6
 The assumption of proportional hazard rates can be incorrect as Fitzenberger and Wilke 
(2006 and 2007) have shown with similar data. A more flexible approach which allows the 
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effect of the regressors on the conditional distribution of unemployment duration to vary over 
the quantiles and thus even crossing of the conditional hazard rates, may provide more 
detailed insights, but is left to future research.  
 
7
 This corresponds to the sample mean value of the continuous regional variables and to the 
reference category of the regional dummy variables. 
 
8
 Since )|( xtjΠ  has the properties of a distribution function, one may define the conditional 
marginal quantile effect at quantile q as kjkj xxqxxqt ∂Π∂=∂∂
− /)|(/)|(ˆ 1  as an alternative 
marginal effect. Since a certain share of our unemployed population has zero probability for 
an exit to regular employment, we are faced with the mover - stayer problem (Abbring, 2002; 
Addison and Portugal 2003) which results in the defectiveness of the unemployment duration 
distribution. As a result, )|(1 xqj−Π  does not exist for the upper quantiles so that we decided 
to report the marginal effect on the cumulative probability )|365( xjΠ  only. Moreover, our 
estimation results may be biased due to the defectiveness of the data, but as the degree of 
defectiveness is limited in our data, this problem may be of minor importance.  
 
9
 When the effect is similar for all destinations we simply use the notion unemployment or 
unemployment duration. 
 
10
 We also made estimations in which we distinguished between several types of employment 
subsidies offered by the employment agencies. Surprisingly, the results patterns are similar 
even for subsidized artificial jobs and temporary subsidies of regular employment which have 
a very purpose. For this we decided to report the pooled results only. 
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11
 Minor employment is an employment on a salary of less than 400 euros per month and with 
exemption from social security contributions. 
 
12
 One might retort that the counsellor/customer ratio is endogenous because the number of 
customers should be higher in regions with long average unemployment duration. However, 
we use lagged value, i.e. the average counsellor/customer ratio during the 12 month preceding 
the start of the unemployment spell, which should preclude a direct simultaneity issue. 
Moreover, we use a number of indicators that capture regional labour market conditions such 
that the remaining variation in the customer/counsellor ratio is likely to mainly reflect the 
exogenous variation due to the politically ratio during the study period.motivated 
improvement of the customer/counsellor. 
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